Abstract
This paper critically analyzes the constitutional provisions and practical challenges surrounding the appointment of ministers and the president in Nepal. While the Constitution of Nepal, 2072 provides a formal framework for such appointments through parliamentary procedures but in practice, these processes are frequently undermined by political interference, weak enforcement, and a lack of clear eligibility criteria. The study highlights how political bargaining, party dominance, and coalition dynamics often override merit-based selection, leading to the appointment of individuals lacking the necessary qualifications or competence. It also underscores the absence of constitutional limits on the size of the cabinet and the vague standards for ministerial selection, which have contributed to overexpansion and inefficiency in governance. Using a comparative approach and real-world examples, the research reveals how these gaps erode democratic accountability, transparency, and the principle of separation of powers. The roles of the president, prime minister, and political parties are examined in detail to show how their actions can either support or weaken constitutional integrity. The paper emphasizes the need for reforms that include stricter enforcement of qualification standards, clearer selection guidelines, and increased judicial oversight to ensure appointments align with democratic values and institutional legitimacy. Ultimately, the study argues that safeguarding the constitutional process of appointing ministers is essential to strengthening good governance, political accountability, and the long-term stability of Nepal’s federal democratic system. 

Introduction
Generally, ministers represent the members of parliament and the council of ministers, who recognize themselves as the key figures within the executive and legislative branches ¹.  Ministers are one of the important positions to represent people and the nation².  Ministers in Nepal head various government ministries and form the Council of Ministers, exercising executive authority under the federal government ³. Each ministry is led by a cabinet minister responsible for specific sectors such as Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Health, Education, and more⁴. 
The Prime Minister is the head of government and leads the Council of Ministers, holding executive power along with them. For example, under the current interim government, Sushila Karki is the Prime Minister, with ministers assigned portfolios like Home Affairs, Finance, Energy, and others. Provincial governments also have their ministers heading ministries relevant to their region, such as Economic Affairs, Social Development, Health, and Infrastructure⁵. 
In summary, ministers act as both political leaders and administrators, bridging the gap between policy formulation and practical implementation. They are key government officials responsible for managing specific ministries and implementing government policies at both the federal and provincial levels.

Historical Background
The appointment of ministers in Nepal has evolved significantly over time, reflecting the country’s broader political transformation from an absolute monarchy to a federal democratic republic. In the early modern period, particularly during the Shah dynasty after Nepal’s unification in the 18th century, governance was centralized under the monarchy⁶.  Ministers were not elected or formally appointed through democratic procedures, but rather handpicked by the king from among trusted courtiers, nobles, or military elites. There was little separation of powers, and ministerial roles often lacked clear definitions or accountability mechanisms⁷.  The current system mandates that ministers be appointed from among members of the Federal Parliament, with the Prime Minister having the discretion to choose ministers based on political alliances and the constitutional principle of inclusion⁸. 
Historical Background of the Appointments of Ministers 
The appointment of ministers in Nepal has evolved significantly over time. Before 1846, traditional rulers selected officials such as Kajis and Chautariyas-roles similar to ministers-primarily based on loyalty, lineage, and proximity to power. During the Rana period (1846-1951), absolute rule by hereditary Rana Prime Ministers meant that ministerial positions were confined within the ruling family, with no democratic process involved. Following the fall of the Ranas, the democratic phase (1951-1960) introduced modern ministerial roles, and Nepal formed its first elected government in 1959. However, the Panchayat era (1960-1990) reinstated centralized authority, where the king appointed ministers under a partyless system with minimal public accountability. With the restoration of multiparty democracy from 1990 to 2006, ministers became elected representatives accountable to parliament, though political instability led to frequent cabinet changes. In present-day republican federal Nepal, ministers are appointed according to constitutional provisions and operate at both federal and provincial levels, with clearly defined legal mandates.
Despite these reforms, Nepal’s political history continues to influence ministerial appointments, with coalition politics, patronage, and party interests often taking precedence over merit or inclusion goals.
Constitutional Framework for Ministerial Appointments in Nepal
Nepal’s Constitution delineates a federal structure comprising three tiers of government: federal, provincial, and local. Specific constitutional articles govern the appointment and responsibilities of executive officials at each level, ensuring a clear separation of powers and accountability.

Federal Level
President and Vice President
●    Election and Role:
The President serves as the ceremonial head of state, elected by an electoral college consisting of members of the Federal Parliament and Provincial Assemblies⁹. 
●    The Vice President is similarly elected and assumes the President's duties in their absence¹⁰ . Both offices are subject to removal by impeachment ¹¹. 

Prime Minister and Council of Ministers
●    Appointment:
The President appoints the Prime Minister, typically the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives ¹².  Other ministers, including the Deputy Prime Minister, are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister ¹³. 
●    Composition and Accountability:
The Council of Ministers, comprising up to 25 members including the Prime Minister, is collectively responsible to the Federal Parliament ¹⁴. 
●    Eligibility:
While ministers are generally selected from among Federal Parliament members, non-members may be appointed provided they secure parliamentary membership within six months¹⁵.
●    Oath and Tenure:
All ministers must take an oath of office before assuming their duties¹⁶. Ministerial office becomes vacant upon resignation, removal by the Prime Minister, loss of parliamentary support, or death¹⁷.
Provincial Level
Chief Minister and Provincial Council of Ministers
●    Executive Authority:
Executive power is vested in the Provincial Council of Ministers¹⁸.
●    Appointment:
The Chief Minister is appointed by the Province Chief (State Head)¹⁹. Other ministers are appointed by the Province Chief on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.
●    Composition and Accountability:
The Council of Ministers, led by the Chief Minister, is collectively responsible to the Provincial Assembly²⁰.
Local Level
Local Executive Officials
●    Structure and Authority:
Executive power at the local level is exercised by either the Village Executive or the Municipal Executive²¹.
●    Officials:
Local executive bodies comprise Chairpersons, Vice-Chairpersons, Mayors, Deputy Mayors, and other elected members, in accordance with federal law.
●    Conduct of Business:
The allocation and operation of local executive functions are governed by local laws and executive rules ratified by the respective executive bodies²².

Summary 
At Nepal's federal level, the executive authority rests with the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, who are appointed by the President in accordance with Articles 76, 77, 78, and 80 of the Constitution. At the provincial level, executive power is exercised by the Chief Minister and provincial ministers, appointed by the Province Chief (the ceremonial head of the province) as outlined in Articles 162, 167, and 168. In the local governments, executive authority lies with the Chairperson or Mayor and their respective executive bodies, all of whom are elected directly by the local people under Articles 214, 218, and 219. Meanwhile, Nepal's ceremonial offices-the President and Vice President-are elected by an Electoral College as provided in Articles 62 to 70 of the Constitution.

Legislative Overview
Election Code of Conduct, 2022
The Election Code of Conduct, 2022, delineates a comprehensive framework governing the conduct of candidates, political parties, and their affiliates during electoral periods. Its primary objective is to uphold the principles of free and fair elections by fostering transparency, accountability, and ethical integrity throughout the electoral process. Core provisions encompass limitations on campaign financing, prohibitions against hate speech and the dissemination of false information, and stringent regulations on the utilization of public resources for electoral campaigning. Breaches of the code may result in punitive measures, including disqualification from candidacy and imposition of monetary penalties²³.

Public Procurement Act, 2063(2007)
The Public Procurement Act, 2063 (2007) governs procurement operations within public sector entities, with the aim of promoting fairness, competitive bidding, and transparency in public contracting. This legislation prescribes detailed procedures for tendering, contract adjudication, and vendor selection, thereby mitigating risks of corruption and misappropriation of public funds. The Act mandates that procurement activities adhere to principles of openness and fiscal prudence to guarantee optimal utilization of public resources²⁴.
Good Governance (management and operation) Act, 2064(2008)
The Good Governance (management and operation) Act, 2064(2008) is a legislative instrument designed to institutionalize principles of accountable, participatory, and transparent governance. It emphasizes responsiveness, the rule of law, and citizen involvement in policy formulation and service delivery. The Act also establishes mechanisms for the redress of grievances and the enforcement of administrative accountability, thereby enhancing the efficacy and legitimacy of public institutions²⁵.

Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2008
The Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2008 establishes a robust legal regime aimed at identifying, preventing, and prosecuting money laundering activities. It mandates financial institutions to adopt stringent anti-money laundering protocols, including customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities. The Act imposes severe sanctions on individuals and organizations found guilty of engaging in illicit financial practices²⁶. 

Corruption Prevention Act, 2002 (2059 B.S.)
The Corruption Prevention Act (2002) is intended to systematically combat corruption within public administration by establishing clear definitions of corrupt acts and corresponding penalties. The Act empowers oversight institutions, particularly the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), with investigative authority to address and prosecute instances of malfeasance and abuse of office²⁷. 

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) Act, 2048(1991)
The CIAA Act,2048 (1991) established the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority as an autonomous constitutional body tasked with investigating and curbing corruption among public officials. The Commission is vested with investigatory powers to act on complaints or initiate Suo moto inquiries into the misuse of public office, thereby reinforcing institutional integrity across government entities²⁸. 

Civil Service Act, 2049 (1993)
The Civil Service Act prescribes the legal and procedural framework for recruitment within the civil service. It ensures that appointments, promotions, and disciplinary actions are based on meritocratic principles and competitive examinations. The Act promotes inclusivity, fairness, and equal opportunity in public sector employment, thereby upholding the integrity and professionalism of the civil service²⁹. 

Collectively, these legislative instruments are foundational to the promotion of good governance. They codify ethical standards for public officeholders, enforce transparency in state functions, and institute mechanisms for accountability and anti-corruption, thereby reinforcing democratic norms and public trust in government institutions.

Controversies
After the process of democratization and constitutionalization after 2047 B.S (1990 A.D), Nepal has been covered with a lot of controversies around the appointment and resignation of ministers. Some of the controversies are briefly mentioned below: 

Gajendra Hamal's Resignation Amid Judicial Influence Allegations (2021)
Gajendra Bahadur Hamal resigned just two days after being appointed as Minister for Industry, Commerce and Supplies. His appointment sparked controversy due to reports suggesting he was nominated at the behest of his brother-in-law, then-Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana, raising concerns about the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive³⁰.

Supreme Court Annuls Appointment of Seven Non-Parliamentarian Ministers (2021)
The Supreme Court invalidated the appointments of seven ministers who were not members of the federal parliament, stating that their reappointments violated Article 78 of the Constitution. These individuals had joined the CPN-UML after leaving the Maoist Centre, and their appointments were deemed unconstitutional as they failed to obtain parliamentary membership within the stipulated six months³¹. 

Conflict of Interest in Ministerial Appointments
1.    Lekh Raj Bhatta was appointed as Minister for Industry, Commerce, and Supplies in 2019. Bhatta faced criticism for owning a cooking gas bottling plant, leading to allegations of favoritism by Nepal Oil Corporation. He eventually sold his shares following the controversy³².
2.    Moti Lal Dugar is an industrialist appointed as the state minister for Industry. He was later promoted to financial advisor. His tenure was marred by allegations of bribery and patent rights issues involving his company ³³. 
3.    Prem Ale is a wood trader, and was appointed as Forest Minister. His business background raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest in managing forest resources³⁴.
4.    Bikram Pandey was the Chairman of Kalika Construction. Pandey's appointment as Minister for Urban Development in 2023 was criticized due to his company's involvement in government infrastructure projects, posing a conflict of interest³⁵. 
5.    Dol Prasad Aryal was appointed as Labor Minister. His role as International Marketing Director at a recruitment agency led to concerns about impartiality in overseeing labor migration policies³⁶.
Minister Birendra Mahato's Controversial Proposals in Protected Areas (2023)
Forest and Environment Minister Birendra Mahato faced backlash for advocating commercial ventures like hotels and cable cars within national parks, and for suggesting tiger hunting. Conservationists criticized these proposals as detrimental to environmental preservation³⁷. 

Lila Ballav Adhikari's Unauthorized Foreign Visit Leading to Resignation (2024)
Koshi Province's Minister for Internal Affairs and Law, Lila Ballav Adhikari, resigned after traveling to Japan without prior approval, violating protocols requiring ministers to obtain permission for foreign visits³⁸.
Allegations Against Home Minister Rabi Lamichhane (2024)
Home Minister Rabi Lamichhane was accused of misappropriating funds from cooperative companies before his political career. The allegations led to opposition protests demanding a parliamentary investigation, though Lamichhane denied any wrongdoing³⁹. 

Comparative overview
To better understand how Nepal’s system of appointing ministers compares with other countries, the following table presents a side-by-side overview of key features in Nepal, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This comparison highlights differences and similarities in government structure, who appoints ministers, eligibility requirements, and the role of parliament in each country. It helps show how Nepal’s practices fit within a global context and what lessons can be learned from other democracies.
Nepal and India both operate under a federal parliamentary republic system, where the Prime Minister serves as the head of government and is appointed by the President on the Prime Minister's recommendation. In both countries, ministers must be members of the federal parliament or secure membership within six months, and their cabinet formation is guided by constitutional provisions-Articles 76-78 of Nepal's Constitution and Article 75 of the Indian Constitution. Cabinet size is limited to 25 members federally in Nepal and capped at 15% of the Lok Sabha's strength in India, with ministers collectively accountable to Parliament. The United Kingdom, a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy, appoints its Prime Minister through the monarch on the PM's advice, following established conventions rather than a written constitution. Ministers are usually Members of Parliament or the House of Lords, and there is no fixed limit on cabinet size, with conduct governed by the Ministerial Code. The United States, by contrast, follows a federal presidential republic system where the President is both head of state and government and appoints cabinet members independently, subject to Senate confirmation under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Unlike parliamentary systems, cabinet members need not be legislators. Ethical oversight is maintained through instruments such as the Ethics in Government Act.
Nepal and India have very similar systems due to shared parliamentary structures. UK ministers are more convention-based and may come from either the House of Commons or the Lords, and the US system is entirely different; ministers (called Secretaries) are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with no requirement to be elected lawmakers.

LOOPHOLES
When studied carefully, we can find a lot of loopholes or problems in the Nepalese constitution, which creates ambiguity or provides a way out of some legal norms. Some of such loopholes, along with the risk mentioned, are presented below:
1)    Six-Month Grace Period for Non-MPs 
●    Loophole: A person who is not elected can be appointed as a Minister and stay in power for up to six months⁴⁰.
●    Risk: This can be abused to bring unelected individuals into executive power without democratic legitimacy, often to manipulate by-elections or delay public accountability. 
●    Example: Gajendra Bahadur Hamal was appointed as Minister for Industry, Commerce, and Supplies in October 2021, despite not being an elected member of the Federal Parliament⁴¹ .
2)    No Clear Merit-Based Criteria 
●    Loophole: There are no requirements for education, experience, or ethical qualifications to become a Minister. 
●    Risk: This enables the appointment of unqualified or controversial figures purely based on political loyalty or coalition bargaining. 
●    Example: Vishnu Paudel was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, who had only completed the School Leaving Certificate (SLC), equivalent to Grade 10 ⁴².
3)    Discretionary Cabinet Size (Up to 25 Ministers) 
●    Loophole: The Constitution allows the Prime Minister to appoint up to 25 Ministers⁴³ , but does not set minimum standards for necessity, efficiency, or budgetary discipline. 
●    Risk: It can lead to bloated cabinets as tools of political appeasement rather than governance efficiency. 
4)    Vague Enforcement of Inclusivity 
●    Loophole: While the Constitution mentions "inclusiveness"⁴⁴,  It does not provide binding quotas or clear enforcement mechanisms. 
●    Risk: It leads to token representation, with dominant groups continuing to monopolize power under the guise of inclusivity. 
5)    No Limit on Number of Deputy/State Ministers 
●    Loophole: There is no constitutional cap on the number of Deputy Ministers, State Ministers, or Assistant Ministers within the 25-member cabinet. 
●    Risk: Encourages over-fragmentation of ministries and unnecessary appointments for political gain. 
●    Example: In 2018, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli appointed a disproportionate number of State and Assistant Ministers in his cabinet, many seen as political appointees with little executive role⁴⁵. 
6)    No Provision for Ministerial Competency Review 
●    Loophole: Once appointed, there is no formal performance or competency review of Ministers. 
●    Risk: Poor-performing Ministers can remain in office for full terms unless removed by the Prime Minister or Parliament through a difficult political process.
●    Example: During the COVID-19 crisis, Health Minister Hridayesh Tripathi faced widespread criticism for delays in vaccine procurement, lack of transparency in medical supplies, and poor crisis communication and coordination.
Despite the poor performance during a public health emergency, no formal review mechanism existed to hold him accountable. He remained in office for much of the pandemic without facing an institutional performance appraisal.
7)    Lack of Clarity on the Term
●    Loophole: The article prohibits a person from being elected President more than twice, but does not explicitly define what constitutes a “term.” ⁴⁶
●    Risk: It enables term-limit evasion, legal disputes, and democratic backsliding in Nepal.
●    For instance, if a Vice President becomes President because something unexpected happens (the President resigns or dies), it’s not clear if that time in office would count as one full term under the two-term rule.
8)     Potential for Political Manipulation
●    Risk: The eligibility criteria mentioned in the constitution⁴⁷  they are relatively broad, there’s a possibility for political entities to nominate candidates who meet the basic requirements but may not uphold the spirit of the Constitution or democratic values.
9)    Backdoor Entry to Executive Power
●    Loophole: The constitution allows candidates who lost in direct elections (FPTP) to re-enter Parliament via the Proportional Representation system. This enables them to bypass the disqualification under Article 78(4) and become ministers, effectively circumventing the electorate’s rejection.
●    Risks: This loophole undermines democratic integrity, enabling parties to install rejected candidates in power. It risks political manipulation, erodes public trust, and may provoke legal ambiguities and challenges to constitutional accountability.
●    Example: Renu Kumari Yadav (2022 General Elections)
●    Renu Kumari Yadav, a senior leader of the Janata Samajbadi Party, contested the 2022 federal election under the FPTP system but was defeated. Despite her loss, she was later included in her party's Proportional Representation (PR) list and re-entered the House of Representatives. Since she became an MP through PR, she technically qualified for a ministerial position, despite being rejected by direct public vote, illustrating the very loophole in question.
10)    Dismissal without explanation
●    Loophole: The Prime Minister has full discretion to remove any member of the Council of Ministers at any time⁴⁸. 
●    Risk: This gives the Prime Minister strong control over the cabinet, which can help maintain discipline, but also risks misuse for political favoritism or retaliation.
●    Example: Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli dismissed Purna Bahadur Tamang, the Minister of State for Energy. Tamang publicly supported Kulman Ghising, the Managing Director of the Nepal Electricity Authority, who was controversially removed from his position. Tamang's disagreement with the Prime Minister over Ghising's dismissal led to his removal from the ministerial post. This action was taken without any formal explanation⁴⁹.

Policy Reform Proposals 
1)     Reform the Six-Month Grace Rule
●    Current Issue: Unelected individuals can serve as Ministers for 6 months without public mandate. 
●    Proposed Reform: 
❖    Limit this provision to technocratic roles only, such as Finance or Health. 
❖    Require Parliamentary approval within 30 days of such an appointment. 
❖    If not elected within 3 months, the person must resign. 

2)    Introduce Minimum Eligibility Criteria
Current Issue: No requirement for education, experience, or ethical record. 
Proposed Reform: 
❖    Enact a law defining minimum qualifications (e.g., bachelor’s degree or equivalent, clean legal record, etc.). 
❖    Mandatory declaration of assets and background verification before appointment. 
3)    Cap the Size of the Council of Ministers
●    Current Issue: Cabinet size can go up to 25, leading to bloated governments. 
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Amend the Constitution to limit cabinet size to 15% of the total Parliament members.
❖    Introduce a justification clause for any increase beyond a fixed number (e.g., 15 ministers).

4)    Make Inclusivity Measurable and Enforceable
●    Current Issue: Inclusivity is aspirational but not binding. 
●    Proposed Reform: 
❖    Introduce mandatory quotas for women, Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and other marginalized groups in the Council of Ministers. 
❖    Require the Election Commission or NHRC to audit inclusivity compliance annually. 

5)    Limit Deputy and State Minister Appointments
●    Current Issue: Unlimited appointment of junior ministers. 
●    Proposed Reform: 
❖    Restrict each ministry to one senior and one junior minister maximum. 
❖    Junior ministers should be limited to ministries with national-level scope or cross-sector complexity. 

6)    Performance and Ethics Monitoring Mechanism
●    Current Issue: No system for evaluating Ministers after appointment. 
●    Proposed Reform: 
❖    Set up an Independent Ministerial Evaluation Commission under the Prime Minister’s Office. 
❖    Require annual performance reports of each minister to be tabled in Parliament. 

7)    Define Presidential "Term" Clearly
●    Current Issue: The term is not defined, leading to ambiguity.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Legally define a "term" as any tenure exceeding 180 days.
❖    Apply the definition retroactively to avoid future manipulation.

8)    Establish Ethical Vetting for Ministerial Nominees
●    Current Issue: Lack of ethical standards leads to poor governance.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Create an ethics panel under the Election Commission to vet nominees.
❖    Disqualify candidates with serious corruption or human rights charges.

9)    Close the PR Re-entry Loophole
●    Current Issue: Defeated FPTP candidates can re-enter via PR and become ministers.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Ban ministerial appointments for those defeated in the same election cycle.
❖    Amend Article 78(4) to reflect this disqualification.

10)    Regulate Ministerial Dismissals
●    Current Issue: PM can dismiss any Minister at will.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Require written notice and reasons submitted to Parliament.
❖    Allow Ministers to appeal to an independent tribunal.

11)    Introduce Mandatory Conflict of Interest Disclosures
●    Current Issue: Ministers are not required to declare financial interests.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Mandate full asset and interest disclosures before appointment.
❖    Establish penalties for false or missing information.
12)    Codify the Ministerial Code of Conduct
●    Current Issue: No binding code regulates behavior.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Legislate a national ministerial conduct framework.
❖    Enforce sanctions for violations, including censure and suspension.

13)    Establish a Ministry Rationalization Commission
●    Current Issue: Ministries are sometimes created or fragmented for political gain.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Form a commission to evaluate ministry effectiveness and suggest restructuring.
❖    Limit ad hoc creation of ministries through executive orders.

14)    Mandate Parliamentary Hearings for Ministerial Appointments
●    Current Issue: No scrutiny before appointment.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Require nominees to undergo hearings by relevant Parliamentary committees.
❖    Allow public transparency and media access to proceedings.

15)    Create a National Leadership Registry
●    Current Issue: Lack of systematic tracking of ministerial performance and background.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Maintain a public online database of all ministers' qualifications, experience, and service records.

16)    Enforce Term Limits for Ministers
●    Current Issue: No cap on how many terms a person can serve as Minister.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Limit service to two full ministerial terms in 10 years.
17)    Ban Nepotism in Ministerial Hiring
●    Current Issue: Ministers appoint family members in advisory or personal staff roles.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Ban appointments of close relatives without a transparent process.
❖    Enforce through audits and disciplinary action.

18)    Mandate Gender Parity Goals
●    Current Issue: Women are underrepresented despite inclusivity rhetoric.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Set targets for at least 33% female representation in ministerial positions.
❖    Tie compliance to party subsidies or electoral benefits.

19)    Link Ministry Budgets to Performance
●    Current Issue: Budgets are allocated regardless of outcomes.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Adopt outcome-based budgeting for all ministries.
❖    Suspend budget increases for underperforming ministries.

20)    Empower the National Human Rights Commission
●    Current Issue: Ministers can act with impunity in human rights matters.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Grant NHRC the authority to investigate and recommend prosecution for ministers violating human rights.
❖    Make compliance with NHRC directives binding on the executive.

21)    Disallow Dual Executive Roles (e.g., PM also holding multiple ministries)
●    Current Issue: Prime Ministers or key leaders often hold multiple ministries.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Amend rules to limit one person to holding no more than one ministry in addition to their primary role.
22)    Set Fixed Criteria for Ministerial Portfolios
●    Current Issue: Portfolios are assigned arbitrarily, often without relevance to background or expertise.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Introduce a matrix of minimum qualifications or experience for key ministries (e.g., Finance, Law, Health).

23)    Require Public Disclosure of Ministerial Credentials
●    Current Issue: Ministerial appointees often lack transparency about qualifications.
●    Proposed Reform:
❖    Mandate public disclosure of academic, professional, and legal records before appointment.
❖    Establish a central online portal for public scrutiny of nominees.

Optional Constitutional Amendment Area: 
●    Articles relating to the  Council of Ministers, appointment of Ministers, and the inclusivity clause (e.g., Articles 76 and 78) should be reviewed and refined with the above checks and balances. 

Conclusion
The appointment process of Nepal is increasingly influenced by coalition politics, power-sharing arrangements, and partisan considerations rather than by meritocratic standards or constitutional discipline. This has led to the expansion of the Council of Ministers beyond functional necessity, contributing to inefficiency, public disillusionment, and erosion of democratic norms. The discretionary powers exercised by both the Prime Minister and the President in ministerial appointments further complicate the accountability mechanisms envisioned in a federal democratic system.
To address the challenges in Nepal’s ministerial appointment process, several important reforms are needed. First, the ambiguities in the Constitution, particularly regarding the appointment and reappointment of non-parliamentarian ministers, must be clarified. This could be done through either a constitutional amendment or by binding judicial interpretations that provide clear guidelines for such appointments. Without this clarity, the current system leaves room for misuse and undermines democratic processes.
Second, there is an urgent need to impose a legal limit on the number of ministers in the Cabinet. Currently, the frequent expansion of the cabinet, often influenced by coalition politics, leads to inefficiencies and unnecessary bureaucratic growth. By setting a clear limit on the number of ministers, the government can prevent over-expansion, ensuring that the Cabinet remains focused and effective, rather than becoming a tool for political bargaining.
Third, strengthening parliamentary oversight is essential to ensure that ministerial appointments remain transparent and accountable. Parliament should have greater powers to scrutinize the roles, qualifications, and performance of ministers regularly. This will not only ensure that ministers are fit for their positions but also help to maintain the public’s trust in the executive branch. Accountability mechanisms will help ensure that political considerations do not outweigh the principles of good governance.
By implementing these reforms, Nepal can align the ministerial appointment process more closely with constitutional principles. This will strengthen the rule of law, improve governance, and restore public confidence, ultimately contributing to political stability and the long-term consolidation of Nepal’s democratic system.