Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) is perhaps one of the most controversial figures in jurisprudence due to his ideas on sovereignty, democracy, and the law, which are contradictory to modern democratic ideas on those topics. 
As problematic as his ideas may sound, they provide an alternative perspective on ideas like "rule of law", "pluralism", and "liberal democracy", which today are treated as irreplaceable parts of legal systems and legal discourse. Carl Schmitt argues that sovereignty lies with the one who decides exceptional meaning; in times of crisis the sovereign has the power to suspend law to preserve order. Schmitt was critical of liberal democracy and believed law derives its authority from politics and their ability to enforce decisions. 

"Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." – Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (1922) 

"The existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute. The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation, as one would say." – Carl Schmitt, Political Theology 

"Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but un-equals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second—if the need arises— the elimination or eradication of heterogeneity." – Carl Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923) 

Schmitt has dealt with the concept of the sovereign in his Political Theology. First, it is important to understand what he means by the exception. 

For Schmitt, the exception is a borderline concept; a situation which involves a threat to the public interest, or even a threat to the existence of the state, public safety and order and so on which is not codified in the existing legal system. The details of how and what type of emergency happens cannot be anticipated in constitutions. At most, they define only who will deal with the emergency. The body which makes the decision in such a situation is the sovereign. The sovereign, then, is the one who can decide to stand outside the legal order in such a situation and suspend the law. 

Indeed, most Constitutions allow for the suspension of the provisions of the constitution in times of emergency. For Schmitt the application of general norms or laws requires a normal situation. Laws are made with a certain normal frame of life in mind. Thus, a normal situation must exist for the application of laws and for a legal order to make sense. To apply laws made for a normal situation in an unforeseen or abnormal situation would actually be detrimental to the public interest. For example, during a pandemic attempting to uphold the right to freedom of movement would be detrimental to the public interest. 

Similarly, during wartime, the political and legal processes did not happen as they usually do. For example, Ukraine should have held elections in 2024 but due to the war it failed to do so. Both situations are exceptional cases where the law was suspended due to the sovereign decision undertaken for the Public Interest. For Schmitt it is the sovereign who ultimately decides if this normal situation exists or not. 

Ultimately for Schmitt, juristically speaking, sovereign power does not have the  monopoly to apply force as other jurists would argue but rather has the monopoly to make the ultimate decision. As per Schmitt all law is 'situational law', the legal order is not based on the norm but rather the decision of the sovereign. Hence his view that the state is superior to the law, the law is not by itself powerful or does not apply itself, only exists if the sovereign decides so and can be suspended if the sovereign decides so. 

To understand his view on democracy and the law, his political analysis also must be understood first. For Schmitt; sovereign, the political state precedes the Law. In his Concept of The Political (1932), Schmitt writes that the fundamental distinction in politics is that between Friend and Enemy. As Schmitt puts it "an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity", and that such distinctions are inherently politically cannot be decided by a previously determined general norm or by the judgment of a neutral third party. The 'other', the 'enemy' is the core concept of Schmitt's politics. 

He points out that one might argue from a moral or liberal perspective that this is an "old" or "barbaric" understanding, but he argues that rationally, normatively the basis of politics is in the friend enemy distinction. To look at it legally, he points out that "Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term". That is to say that law is not neutral and also cannot be understood on its own but should be rather understood from the perspective of the political and the friend-enemy distinction. 

When viewing democracy, Schmitt argues in ‘Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy’, that democracy itself is only a method of organisation (instead of seeing it as a political view as argued by some). He points out that conservative and progressive, pacifistic and militaristic all sorts of democracies have existed. Democracy demonstrates its political power by keeping the alien or the enemy out per Schmitt. The enemy could be anything and the basis of homogeneity could be anything, for many nations it is in ethnicity, for others in religion or even in political ideology. Despite the basis, there is an effort to keep anything that is foreign, unequal and that threatens homogeneity at bay. 

The idea of universal equality and rights in democracy for all members of the state is a liberal idea rather than a democratic idea. Schmitt points out the example of the British Empire, which was a democracy but those in the colonies could not vote in British elections as that would have led to a collapse of the empire and state. Some parts of this idea remain today as even the most democratic countries restrict naturalised citizens from the highest political posts. 

As Schmitt points out "In the domain of the political, people do not face each other as abstractions, but as politically interested and politically determined persons, as citizens, governors or governed, politically allied or opponents—in any case, therefore, in political categories. In the sphere of the political, one cannot abstract out what is political, leaving only universal human equality". For Schmitt politics cannot be governed by neutral, depoliticized norms when the very nature of it is the opposite. Therefore for Schmitt this is a contradiction which threatens the foundations of liberal and parliamentary democracy. 

It is easy to reject these ideas because of an ingrained legal, political or even a moral framework in mind which posits liberal democracy, the rule of law, uncontrolled or chaotic pluralism as natural, irreplaceable and inherently positive. One need not look far from Nepal to witness the instability of parliamentary and liberal democracy, or to observe the political crisis anywhere in the world. In moments of worldwide crisis, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic; world has seen the state take the central authority while the legal norms take the backseat. In such contexts, upholding of certain legal ideas based on moral frameworks is inadequate and with the current state of the world in mind, the ideas of Schmitt, if not wholly applied, deserves a consideration.